Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations

Biology

6-2005

Reductionism and Holism, Chance and Selection,
Mechanism and Mind
Ursula Goodenough
Washington University in St Louis, goodenough@wustl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs
Part of the Biology Commons, Ethics in Religion Commons, and the Evolution Commons
Recommended Citation
Goodenough, Ursula, "Reductionism and Holism, Chance and Selection, Mechanism and Mind" (2005). Biology Faculty Publications
& Presentations. 88.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs/88

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biology at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information,
please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

Reductionism and Holism, Chance and Selection,
Mechanism and Mind
Ursula Goodenough
Department of Biology
Washington University
Draft of article published in Aygon 40:369-380 (2005)
Abstract
Despite its rich and deepening panoply of empirical support,
evolutionary theory continues to generate widespread concern.
Some of this concern can be attributed to misunderstandings of the
original concept, some to unfamiliarity with its current trajectories, and
some to strongly held fears that it strips the human of cherished
attributes. This essay seeks to deconstruct such misunderstandings,
lift up current concepts of what evolution entails, and address some
of the existential issues it generates.
Key Words: Evolution, neo-Darwinism, emergence, free will
Author: Ursula Goodenough is Professor of Biology in the
Department of Biology, Washington University, St. Louis MO 63130;
email ursula@biology.wustl.edu

A philosopher friend recently asked me the following questions:
1) What is your understanding of evolution and its religious
relevance?
2) Might you address the deep question as to whether the worldview
implied by most standard science is mechanistic? Is it possible to
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show that Neo-Darwinism does not affirm the mechanistic world view,
that it provides for the causal efficacy of free and purposive action?
Or, how you do see the worldview assumed and affirmed by
mainstream science?
3) Can Neo-Darwinism itself be reformulated so as to make much
clearer than is normally done that it has room for more dimensions of
the total life process?
These questions have stimulated the remarks I offer below. I
offer them in the context of a paper that Terry Deacon and I recently
published in Zygon (1) wherein we consider various aspects of the
evolutionary process, and human evolution in particular, from the
perspective of emergence, with a focus on the moral facet of religious
response. It is my hope that these two essays will illustrate that
present-day “mainstream” evolutionary concepts are exciting, multidimensional, and have much to offer to the religious life. I also
grapple, in this essay, with the question of why these concepts are so
often misunderstood and so often the target of vilification.
Neo-Darwinism
I realized in starting out that I didn’t know what Neo-Darwinism
is. So I entered it in www.google.com. The #1 hit was to a site
criticizing Neo-Darwinism and favoring the panspermia theory
wherein life comes in from other planets. The next 3 hits were
critiques offered by creationist/intelligent design organizations. As I
continued to read, I came to understand that the term Neo-Darwinism
serves as code for views of the evolutionary process that a variety of
persons and groups are not comfortable with.
The original term, neo-Darwinian theory, was not an -ism.
Rather, it referred to the coupling of two understandings: 1) the 19thcentury Darwinian understanding that selection acting on heritable
variation would produce evolutionary change and 2) the early 20thcentury understanding that heritable variants arise by the apparently
random process of gene mutation. While features of this synthesis
have been summarized in various short phrases, the original version
of the theory, in Julian Huxley’s Evolution: the Modern Synthesis
(1942), was book-length, and multiple additional layers of
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understanding of the relationship between genetics and evolution
have been accumulating in the ensuing 60 years.
Particularly interesting is that whereas there appears to be
broad appreciation that atomic theory, for example, has deepened
profoundly since its original articulation, bringing us quarks and
strong and weak nuclear forces and the like, neo-Darwinian theory is
described by Neo-Darwinism detractors in much the form that it was
originally set forth. The additional layers of understanding -- the
evolutionary role of gene duplications and of mutations in genetic
regulatory elements, for example – are hard to find in web-site
treatises on Neo-Darwinism.
So why is it the case that atomic theory has not become
“Atomism” and its “Atomist” adherents the target of critical websites,
whereas neo-Darwinian theory has become the nefarious NeoDarwinism practiced by reductionistic materialistic know-it-all NeoDarwinists? Why are there no proposals that “overturn” Atomism
while proposals abound that “expose the fatal flaws” of a 60-year-old
version of evolutionary theory called Neo-Darwinism? The answer, I
can only presume, is that atomic theory does not seem to generate
existential concerns while neo-Darwinian theory clearly does.
I will take up the matter of existential concern below. But at this
juncture, given that the term Neo-Darwinism has come to carry such
baggage, I suggest that it be jettisoned and that we just talk about
present-day theories of biological evolution.
With that said, we can go on to examine the pejoratives
“reductionistic” and “materialistic,” which will lead us into our
philosopher’s question about “mechanistic.”
Reductionism and Holism
I am a bench scientist, a molecular geneticist/cell biologist, and
have devoted my career to the study of a eukaryotic single-celled
green alga called Chlamydomonas. My colleagues and I have made
contributions to an understanding of how the organism carries out
photosynthesis, how it swims, how it forms its cell wall, how it
conducts its sexual cycle, and how the genes that encode various
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sexual traits have diverged when two closely related Chlamydomonas
species are compared.
Our experiments are “reductionistic” in the sense that they
focus on genes and proteins and not the whole organism or its
ecological context. From a physicist’s perspective, of course, our
experiments are not reductionist at all since we pay no attention to
individual atoms or quarks, albeit we are fully aware that these levels
of organization are “down there” and have everything to do with what
we attend to; indeed, their existence is fully implicit in our
experimental design and interpretation. By the same token, we are
fully aware that the molecular facets of Chlamydomonas that we are
studying have everything to do with the whole organism and its
ecological context, and should we obtain an experimental result that
is inconsistent with these “larger” understandings – e.g. if our data
indicate that a protein operates in a certain way after boiling and we
know that Chlamydomonas is killed by boiling -- we would conclude
that this property of the protein, albeit of possible interest for some
reason, is irrelevant to the organism as a whole. Again, by the same
token, scientists studying the ecology of Chlamydomonas try to keep
what is known about its genes and proteins fully in view as they ask
their “larger” questions, just as they also understand that the
Chlamydomonas ecosystem is but a tiny part of an enormous
biosphere which is but a miniscule part of an enormous universe.
That is, the ecologists are also reductionists.
So who are the “holists”? I would respond that no scientist, and
no scholar in any field for that matter, is a holist when asking a
specific question, since specificity is by definition focused on some
facet of the whole. But I would also respond that all scientists are
holists in that we are all aware, when making a specificity move at
whatever “level,” that the specifics reside in wholes, where wholes
are emergent from parts and hence have different properties from
individual parts.
Systems Thinking
A critique that is often leveled at molecular-level biologists is
that we have ignored the existence of complex systems in our
reductionistic fervor to analyze genes and proteins, that we eschew
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the “holistic” concepts articulated in complexity theory and its
synonyms.
Without in any way disparaging the important theoretical
contributions made to our understanding of complex systems by the
likes of Prigogene and Kauffman, an understanding that organisms
are made up of complex systems has been a core understanding of
biology since the inception of the field. Metabolic pathways,
embryology, neural networks, animal behavior, and so on can only be
understood as complex systems, and as a graduate student 40 years
ago this was the implicit grounding of everything that I was taught.
But once the modern-day principles of complex systems
thinking are grasped – once one understands the thermodynamic
constraints and possibilities, the importance of initial and boundary
conditions and the interdependence of events – biologists in recent
decades have gone ahead and sought to understand a specific
system by studying its parts: How does microtubule sliding
participate in the emergent system called flagellar motility? How
does cell migration participate in the formation of a nervous system
during embryology? How does sequential expression of homeobox
genes set out the animal body plan? In asking such questions we
have in no way lost sight of the system as a whole; rather, we are
asking questions of the system that allow us to better understand how
it acquires its holistic properties.
As it turns out, the upshot of taking this approach is that
molecular-level biologists are in fact now in a position to take on
systems-based research more directly, where genome projects,
widely reviled for their reductionist focus, have provided many of
these opportunities. Genome-based technologies now make it
possible, for example, to identify all the proteins that participate in
such complex systems as repair of environmentally-induced DNA
damage or the responses of a plant to desiccation or the metastatic
growth of a tumor. Some of the proteins identified are those that we
already knew something about from previous studies, others are new
foci for investigation, and the meta-project is to figure out how they all
interact, in space and time, to generate the resultant complex traits.

5

Importantly, scientists are flocking to explore these
opportunities, documenting that it is not so much that we were ever
uninterested in complex systems as that we didn’t have productive
ways to study them. A case in point is Marc Kirschner, for decades at
the forefront of research in molecular cell biology and molecular
evolution, who has recently founded and chairs a well-endowed
Department of Systems Biology at Harvard Medical School.
With these observations in mind, we can return to biological
evolution and consider a typical finding (2) from my website
explorations:
Darwin deliberately stressed the reductionistic, physicalist
aspects of his theory in order to eliminate any hint of the
involvement of a designer or a vital force in his explanation of
the development of living things. Rather, the rhetoric of
Darwinism is of a ‘force’ (selection) acting upon essentially
passive objects considered in isolation (organisms). It is the
rhetoric of physics. And physics has also profoundly influenced
molecular biology; genes are described as strings of chemicals
to which mutations happen. It may be, however, that the
rhetoric of evolution in the next century will be much more in
terms of Kauffman’s work on self-organization and the
development of complexity, of interdependent organisms
exploring together the possibilities of greater complexity.
There are several misconceptions here to lift up right at the
start. 1) Darwin, an ardent and accomplished naturalist, would have
decried a definition of organisms as passive objects acting in
isolation. 2) While it is true that self-organization, complexity, and
interdependence can be discussed without reference to genes and
mutations, selection is a central dynamic in Kauffmanian theory (3).
3) Most importantly, self-organization and the development of
complexity in biology are not abstract ethereal processes. They
occur in cell-based organisms that are constructed from
macromolecules, and those strings-of-chemicals-to-which-mutationshappen are the instructions for generating the macromolecules that
go on self-organize and interact. Any informed present-day “rhetoric
of evolution” will include both the parts and the wholes, both the
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emergent properties and the genomes that encode them, and I
cannot but imagine that this will always be the case.
Materialism
Not only is it the case that self-organization and complex
systems are not abstract ethereal processes in biology; they are also
not abstract ethereal processes in general. Kauffman’s formulations
are steeped in the material, chock-full of physicality and
thermodynamics. Yet they are often described, approvingly, as
somehow taking us beyond the material.
Poor matter. This magical stuff, undergirding everything that
we know to exist (including the minds that hold our understandings of
existence), is so very often given such disparaging qualifiers as
“mere” matter or “just” matter or “only” matter. Indeed, a central
problem that I have with some versions of the Gaia hypothesis is that
there is a way that it asks us to value the non-living participants in the
biosphere – the rocks and the gases -- by saying that they are alive.
I myself prefer the perspective of religionist Michael Kalton (4):
What the poet Robinson Jeffers has referred to as "the massive
mysticism of stone" surrounds us, inviting us to discover the
patterning that lives in geologic time or even cosmic time, these
being substrate to patterns manifest in the rapid complexity of life
time. What is it from which we have emerged, and to which we
return at death? It cannot be less than us, for we are formed of it,
belong to it, manifest it.
Chance and Selection
Evolutionary theory is often misunderstood to claim that
everything somehow happened “randomly.” I participate in a listserv
that focuses on exploring the concept of religious naturalism
(religious orientations derived from our understandings of nature (5)),
and this sentiment is well stated in the following posting:
My hunch, based on my experience as a member and leader in
the liberal United Church of Christ, is that people are there on a
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Sunday morning because they can't accept that the wonders
opened up by science, astronomy, etc. are all a matter of
chance. They have rejected traditional views of a God in
heaven judging HIS sinful creation, but awe without purpose
and meaning behind it is just as meaningless to them.
They might find much support in the concept of religious
naturalism were it not that they are looking for truth and values
beyond chance, and indeed beyond human experience.
I would agree that if one's only understanding of the natural
world is that it is all just a matter of chance, one might well look
elsewhere for sources of meaning. But that's not the core message I
get from the natural world. I encounter a natural world that is
brimming with meaning in and of itself, just by being itself, wherein
serendipitous creativity (as theologian Gordon Kaufman so
wonderfully puts it (6)) generates countless emergent properties that
build on themselves. These include the lives that we live, lives that
are like no others given the cultures we have created and the
sensibilities we transmit through them. From my perspective, what
more meaning might one want than the astonishing FACT of it all?
But back to the matter of chance.
“Serendipitous” creativity is of course a word that connotes
chance, and chance for sure plays a big part in the creativity of the
universe. But to say that the wonders of the universe are all a matter
of chance is a misunderstanding. Chance on its own wouldn't have
accomplished much of anything. Chance offers up the variation - the
possible atoms, the possible molecules, the possible lifeforms, the
possible ecosystems. Chance is the generator of creativity, the grist
in the mill, that allows new things to happen.
But chance is inexorably coupled with selection, which operates
on that which is created by chance to generate atoms that hold
together and molecules that fold into useful shapes and lifeforms that
are adapted to their environment and ecosystems that sustain their
participants. Serendipity means chance with a positive outcome,
and positive outcomes are the product of selection, in all its countless
guises, be it selection for stable atomic nuclei or selection for
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thermodynamically favorable molecular outcomes or selection for
viable ecosystems, including the cultural ecosystems that humans
construct and inhabit. Selection generates that which has carried on.
“Selection,” of course, has its own set of problems in that it’s
another one of those discomfiting words. The website quote above
includes an interesting example of this. The writer expresses dismay
that “the rhetoric of Darwinism is of a ‘force’ (selection),” and that this
thereby “eliminates any hint of the involvement of … a vital force.”
I would respond that if any known force makes the cut as a vital
force, it is natural selection acting on emergent properties.
Mechanism and Machines
So we are now positioned to consider our philosopher’s query
about “mechanistic” worldviews. To what extent is an organism like a
machine – i.e. mechanistic -- and to what extent is it not?
In approaching this question, it is germane to first explore how
we feel about machines. Most people, in hearing this question, likely
harbor the hope that the answer will be that an organism is very
different from a machine. This hope arises, I would suggest, because
most don’t hold machines in very high existential regard. While we
may admire machines and what they are able to accomplish, they
are, after all, things, constructed of “mere” matter (activating our
difficulties with matter), and they are, in the end, automatons, a noun
that we are concerned might apply to organisms like ourselves.
Indeed, I hear this concern in our philosopher’s query: “Is it possible
to show that Neo-Darwinism does not affirm the mechanistic world
view, that it provides for the causal efficacy of free and purposive
action?”
To develop the machine metaphor, let’s take a familiar machine,
the stuff underneath the hood of a car. What’s important about this
machine, and indeed any machine, is not what’s under the hood but
rather what it generates, its emergent property, in this case car
motility (automotiveness). A machine has purpose and value only to
the extent that it produces an emergent outcome with purpose and
value.
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Granted that, it follows that the more flexible a machine, the
more purposes it can serve and hence the greater its value. A car
engine that can operate at only one speed is not as valuable as one
that can operate at many speeds, so much thought is put into
designing gears and accelerators and drive shafts that can bring
about this result. A car engine can’t run without fuel, so much
thought is put into designing fuel tanks and indicator gauges that
minimize this occurrence. Motility that can’t stop is dangerous, so
much goes into designing effective brakes. A car that can only
operate at one ambient temperature is not as adaptive as one that
can operate at many, hence antifreezes, cooling devices, and so on.
Importantly, as these valuable systems are designed and
modified, the engineer, in the end, is constantly monitoring the whole
car: Does it still move adaptively? Add a new fuel injection system,
say, and many other parts may need to be modified such that this
innovation is commensurate with the whole point of a car.
And now to organisms. If we look at a trait like motility, found
throughout the biological kingdom in numerous manifestations, we
find ingenious mechanisms – yes, mechanisms – that allow for
different rates of speed, different means of providing and monitoring
fuel, different ways to start and stop, and different ways that
movement continues under an array of environmental conditions.
There are two critical differences, of course. 1) During biological
evolution, the new ideas and their modifications and integrations are
offered up by chance mutations and not by the mind of an engineer,
so the time scales are vastly different and the innovations are not
thought-through-in-advance on the basis of culturally transmitted
knowledge. 2) A biological machine like a muscle is not assembled
from pre-fabricated parts like a car engine; rather, it is the outcome of
embryology, with muscles and their innervating nerve cells
differentiating from precursor cells that differentiated from precursor
cells that ultimately go back to the fertilized egg, all under the aegis of
elegant systems of activation and constraint, hormones and cell-cell
contacts, and differential gene expression. At the level of
construction, that is, the two projects have nothing in common: car
engines are built top-down, muscles are built bottom-up.
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But in the end, the overall product can be said to be the same:
machines that move. And importantly, natural selection isn’t looking
at the parts or the construction modality. Natural selection doesn’t
“see” genes or proteins, doesn’t “know” about embryological stages.
Natural selection evaluates whether a creature can carry on, or not, in
the context it finds itself to be in. Natural selection monitors
adaptivity, monitors fitting in.
So where does this leave us with “free and purposive action”? I
would say there’s little problem with “purposive”: organisms, like
machines, are nothing if not purposive. Watch a “lowly” bacterium or
amoeba moving up a gradient towards a food source, or a “lowly”
plant bending towards a light source, and it’s all about purpose. So
this leaves us with the matter of “free.”
How Free Is Our Will?
If a car salesman were to tell you that the car under
consideration operates freely, with no constraints, you would
doubtless not buy it. A car (and an organism) must be
mechanistically reliable if it has any chance at all of generating its
purposive emergent properties. When a carburetor starts to operate
freely, the car is taken to the shop for a tune-up. This is not to say
that the carburetor (and the organism) is without choices, but the
choices (how much air to mix with the gas, what constitutes a food
gradient) are under exquisite regulation.
But I suspect that our philosopher’s question is not about a
carburetor and probably not about an amoeba either. And likely not
even about a spider or a snake. The heart of the question as I hear it
is this: If one buys into the “Neo-Darwinian” claim that humans share
common ancestors with amoebae and snakes, then does this mean
that WE are as mechanistic as they are and hence without “free will”?
Granted that debates on free will fill countless volumes of
philosophical reflection with little consensus, I nonetheless believe
that evolutionary perspectives can offer insight on this topic. I will first
make some general observations and then explore some of the
concepts more closely.
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Evolution, we have said, continuously offers up innovation. The
conspicuous innovation during hominid evolution is the languagebased human brain that, in turn, generates what we call “conscious
self-awareness” or the “narrative self.” We consider at length
elsewhere the remarkable properties of the human mind and
scenarios for its evolution (1), so I will only make two points here.
1) Whereas it is not known, and may never be known, what
language was originally “for” (hunting? mating?), it is clearly the
case that once instantiated, it set up a co-evolutionary dynamic
of language, mind, and cultural transmission of ideas that has
obviously been enormously adaptive for our species; indeed,
this dynamic generates the niche (human culture) that we
immediately inhabit, contributing to our myopias about the
other niches we inhabit.
2) The origination and selective advantage of possessing a
narrative self is similarly obscure, and indeed one speculation
suggests that the narrative self was at first not under direct
selection at all but rather arose as a by-product, an unintended
consequence (a “spandral” in the terminology of Stephen Jay
Gould) of selection for language and cultural habitation.
Importantly, once a “spandral” arises and proves to be adaptive,
it becomes a putative substrate for future rounds of natural
selection, and I believe that there are few who would disagree
that the narrative self has been a central player in the
evolutionary/cultural trajectory of Homo sapiens.
However narrative selves came into being, and however much
they are reducible to their underlying, and mechanistic, neural
substrates, they are quintessentially emergent, and one of their
emergent properties is a sense of free will, a sense that we have the
capacity to make free choices. I would put this sensibility on an equal
footing with our sense that we see red or smell a flower or love our
children. Such psychological experiences come to us – we do not
somehow force them into being – and I would argue that they have
the same claim to being “natural,” “real,” and “true” as the neural
mechanisms that make them possible or, for that matter, as any
emergent property on offer.
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To explore these assertions more closely, let me tell a story that
may be helpful in thinking about the narrative self and its relationship
to the rest of our minds.
The stairway in my house goes up 5 wide steps, reaches a platform
landing, and then goes up another 5 wide steps. On the wall of the
landing are shelves that house what we call the museum, a collection of
shells and bones and feathers found on the beach.
One recent afternoon, home alone, I had added something to the museum
and took two steps backwards to view the resultant effect. As it turned
out, I was already at the edge of the landing, meaning that when I took the
two steps backwards I was in mid-air above the stairway.
I calculate that what happened next took place within about half a second,
and entailed two aspects of my mind that I'll call Ursula 1 and Ursula 2.
Ursula 1: What's going on? I'm in mid-air. Oh no, I must have stepped
off the landing. Idiot! [Visual image of the stairs below, including the
severe right angles of the wooden step-edges and the wooden floor at the
bottom] Jeese, if I fall backwards on those stairs I'm going to cream
myself. [Visual image of Gray's Anatomy diagram of the human spine and
the effects of the edges slamming into vertebrae of arched falling back]
Christ, I could break my back. [Visual images of lying at bottom of stairs
with broken back] Gads, I'm all alone here. [Visual images of dragging
myself to phone and calling 911, then of ambulances pulling in and EMTs
spilling into the front door]
Ursula 2 : With body held vertical, rotate 180 degrees in a perfect mid-air
pivot so facing forward. Plant left foot firmly in middle of first step when
land on it. Keeping that footing, lean body to right, where there's a wall,
and slam shoulder into wall. Put right foot down. Motion ceases.

So what do we have here? Ursula 2 is clearly a machine, and a
good thing too, since if my fate had been in the hands of Ursula1 the
outcome would undoubtedly have been a disaster. Reliably, and
without rehearsal, she did what needed to be done: Assess the
situation, figure out the solution, and initiate the requisite sequential
neuromuscular pathways. Impressive as hell. And of course,
squirrels do such things routinely. They’re also impressive as hell.
Admire as we may the design features and adaptivity of what’s under
the hoods of our cars, the internal combustion engine with all its
ancillary gadgets doesn’t hold a candle to the simplest of brains, let
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alone a squirrel’s, where memory and perception are integrated to
initiate and carry out behavior appropriate to the circumstance.
But what about Ursula 1? Although I could not formally prove
this claim to a skeptic, it is my deep conviction that Ursula 1, my
narrative self, also has a fully neural substrate, a machine that
accesses and integrates perceptual and memory and emotional
systems and generates emergent analyses of cause (must have
stepped off landing), self-evaluation (idiot!), and scenarios of possible
future outcomes (broken back) and possible responses to those
outcomes (calling 911). The brain-based sources of Ursula 1 might
be called Ursula 0.
And here we arrive at the crucial existential interface: Given
that Ursula1 is emergent from Ursula 0, what is the nature of their
relationship to one another? At one extreme, is it the case that our
narrative selves are in some sense just watching a movie of what
Ursula 0 generates (whatever that means)? Or are we directors of
the movie, telling Ursula 0 what to come up with next for us to watch
(whatever that means)? When we engage in making a choice, is it
just Ursula 0 doing this and then telling Ursula 1 about it, or do our
narrative selves have input into the process, or do they somehow
control the process?
It is my understanding that brain neuroscientists, while deeply
interested in these questions, are still far from having answers, their
current focus being on trying to figure out what Ursula 0 and Ursula 1
are all about (they’ve made huge progress on Ursula 2) so that they
can better understand how they interrelate. But the prevailing hunch
is that it’s going to be a complex kind of synergy, where sometimes
we’re just watching and sometimes exercising levels of director-like
causality. Even when these relationships are understood more
deeply, however, even when we have some notion of what we’re
talking about when we say things like “watching” and “exercising
causality,” it won’t affect our sense that our narrative selves are
making the choices that they make, because that’s the way the
experience of choosing comes to us. Any other players in the
dynamic are as inaccessible to our narrative selves as is Ursula 2’s
process in executing the pivot.
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In a claim that I could again not formally prove, it is my
conviction that squirrels have Squirrel 0 (and Squirrel 2) but not
Squirrel 1. That is, they access and integrate memory and emotional
systems and generate analyses of cause and scenarios of future
outcomes and responses, but these processes are not, as near as I
can tell, experienced by narrative squirrel selves. In saying this I am
in no way demeaning the minds of squirrels. I am only saying that
evolution wound up endowing humans with an additional kind of
experience, the narrative experience of experience, which is
apparently rooted in our unique capacity for language.
The most interesting thing about narrative selves is that they
are not experienced as being brain-based even though they are.
They are experienced as disembodied, immaterial, virtual; we carry a
sense that there’s an “I” in there that’s somehow watching and
directing the movie of our lives and falling asleep at night and waking
up in the morning and, yes, dying at the end of a lifetime. The fact
that the emergent property of narrative self-awareness turns out to
manifest itself in this peculiar virtual modality just is the qualia of the
emergent reality of narrative self-awareness.
So I can now circle back to my earlier assertions and say that
Ursula 1, my virtual self, feels like she’s making free choices all the
time, even as it is the case that the brain activity that undergirds this
sense is chugging away in fully mechanical modes of operation. I
would say that this experience, and all the experiences we have in
this virtual modality, are both real and astonishingly rich, potent, and
fruitful. Indeed, it could be said that our collective self-experience as
choice-makers has much to do with much of the good, and much of
the evil as well, that has transpired in our brief history as a species.
To return to our philosopher, the causal efficacy of our sense of free
will is in this sense indisputable.
If religious relevance is to be found in biological evolution -- and
I myself find it all over the place – then surely it is here. Billions of
years of mutation and selection produced reliable, mechanistic
molecular pathways that undergird perception and response in all
creatures. Hundreds of millions of years of mutation and selection in
animals allowed the cooption of these pathways into nervous systems
and brains. Within the last million years, self-aware hominids, and
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then humans, popped through with “minds of their own,” minds that
not only think but experience thinking, minds that not only love but
experience loving, minds that not only choose but tell themselves,
and one another, about the choices they’ve made and plan to make.
A core religious response is a sense of profound gratitude for the
lives that we are given, and I offer such gratitude to the countless
chances and selections that have brought all these wondrous
outcomes into being.
The Dalai Lama can take us out. Maybe it’s not so important,
he said, whether consciousness is an emergent property of biological
evolution or whether it’s something that comes from without. Maybe
what’s more important is what we do with it.
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